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Abstract. Because of the long-term nature of the climate problem, technological advances are often
seen as an important component of any solution. However, when considering the potential for tech-
nology to help solve the climate problem, two market failures exist which lead to underinvestment in
climate-friendly R&D: environmental externalities and the public goods nature of new knowledge.
As a result, government subsidies to climate-friendly R&D projects are often proposed as part of a
policy solution. Using the ENTICE model, I analyze the effectiveness of such subsidies, both with
and without other climate policies, such as a carbon tax. While R&D subsidies do lead to significant
increases in climate-friendly R&D, this R&D has little impact on the climate itself. Subsidies address
the problem of knowledge as a public good, but they do not address the environmental externality, and
thus offer no additional incentive to adopt new technologies. Moreover, high opportunity costs to R&D
limit the potential role that subsidies can play. While R&D subsidies can improve efficiency, policies
that directly affect the environmental externality have a much larger impact on both atmospheric
temperature and economic welfare.
Politicians often propose increased research and development (R&D) spending as
a solution to the climate change problem. Such spending offers the political cover
of doing “something” about climate change while avoiding more painful costs that
may come from regulations requiring emissions reductions. For example, in his
2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush proposed $1.2 billion
of research funding to develop vehicles powered by fuel cells. In 1999, the Presi-
dent’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) recommended
increasing the U.S. energy R&D budget by $500 million in 2005 to address the need
for clean energy sources. Can such policies impact the global climate? Can R&D
subsidies substitute for more restrictive emissions policies? This paper addresses
these questions.
Because of the long-term nature of the climate change problem, technologi-
cal change is often considered a part of any policy solution. There is ample evi-
dence that market forces such as higher prices or stringent environmental policies
induce technological change. For example, Popp (2002) documents dramatic in-
creases in patenting for renewable energy technologies during the energy crisis of
the 1970s. In recent years, economic models of climate policy have paid increas-
ing attention to the links between policy and technological change. Models that
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explicitly link technological progress to climate policy find that such links reduce
the costs of a given policy, as policy levers serve to hasten the development of more
climate-friendly technologies.
Given the importance of policy-induced technological change, as well as a polit-
ical climate that favors R&D subsidies over policies to limit emissions, it is useful
to consider the role that R&D policy, by itself, might play. Such policies are of
interest because, in the language of economists, markets for new knowledge are
imperfect. Spillovers of knowledge make it difficult for inventors to reap the full
social benefits of their innovations. As such, the incentives provided by private mar-
kets for R&D investment lead to underinvenstment in R&D. Policies addressing
this, such as government-funded subsidies for R&D, R&D tax credits, or improved
intellectual property rights to help inventors capture more of the returns to innova-
tion, lead to greater levels of R&D spending, and presumably more innovation as
a result.
Recent work in the field of economics to consider the role of R&D policy as
part of a climate policy portfolio includes Schneider and Goulder (1997), Kvern-
dokk et al. (2004), and Fischer and Newell (2004). Schneider and Goulder (1997)
note that even if it is desirable to postpone the bulk of emissions abatement to
the future (see, for example, Wigley et al., 1996), short-term policies that bring
about low-cost emissions reductions are desirable. One reason for this argument is
that such policies spur innovation, making future emissions abatement less costly.
However, they also find that simply using R&D subsidies to achieve these cost
reductions is not as effective. While R&D subsidies do correct market failures that
pertain to knowledge markets, they do not address environmental market failures,
and thus do not encourage adoption of any newly discovered climate-friendly tech-
nologies. Kverndokk et al. (2004) extend this work by considering both an existing
and potential new alternative energy technology. R&D subsidies increase usage of
the existing alternative energy technology, but as a result delay the introduction
of the newer, and possibly better, technology. Fischer and Newell (2004) compare
R&D subsidies and other policies designed to reduce carbon emissions from the
U.S. electricity sector. They rank R&D subsidies as the least effective for reduc-
ing emissions, but do not consider the effect of knowledge spillovers, and do not
consider the use of multiple policies simultaneously. Outside of economics, papers
such as Caldeira et al. (2003) and Hoffert et al. (2002) emphasize the need for R&D
to increase the availability of carbon-free energy sources for long-term reductions.
This paper builds on this work to study the role of both carbon taxes and R&D
subsidies using the ENTICE model (Popp forthcoming, 2004), an extension of
the well-known DICE model of global warming (Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus and
Boyer, 2000). Like the DICE model, the ENTICE model is dynamic growth model
linking economic activity and the environment. Because it explicitly models the
economic impact of climate damages, the model can be used to simulate optimal
policy paths that balance both the costs and benefits of climate policy. In this paper,
I use the model to compare the effectiveness of R&D subsidies to policies such as
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a carbon tax designed to reduce emissions. Because the ENTICE model calculates
the costs and benefits of each policy, I am able to build on the existing literature by
calculating optimal levels of R&D subsidies. Like Schneider and Goulder, I show
that these subsidies do enhance the effects of other policies, such as a carbon tax,
but that R&D subsidies have little impact on emissions or net economic welfare
when not accompanied by policies designed to limit emissions. Furthermore, by
examining the change in optimal policy paths with and without R&D subsidies, I
show that most of the benefits of R&D subsidies come from cost savings, as there
is little change in emissions under a carbon tax with or without subsidies in place.
Finally, when deciding on a level of government R&D spending, policymakers
need to be aware of the opportunity costs of new R&D spending. Because R&D is
performed by highly-trained personnel, some new energy R&D will likely come at
the cost of other types of productive R&D. If policymakers ignore these costs and
set R&D subsidies too high, the overall macroeconomic effect of subsidies may
even be negative.
1. Theory: Market Failures Affecting Environmental R&D
While market forces will lead firms to do some research on technologies designed
to reduce carbon emissions, there are two reasons to expect markets to underinvest
in such R&D. These market failures provide the motivation for government policy
designed to increase such research. One, of course, is the traditional problem of
environmental externalities. Because carbon emissions are not priced by the mar-
ket, firms and consumers have no incentive to reduce emissions without policy
intervention. This reduces the market for technologies that reduce emissions, and
thus reduces incentives to develop such technologies.1
The second market failure pertaining to R&D is the public goods nature of knowl-
edge (see, for example, Geroski, 1995). In most cases, new technologies must be
made available to the public for the inventor to reap the rewards of invention. How-
ever, by making new inventions public, some (if not all) of the knowledge embodied
in the invention becomes public knowledge. This public knowledge may lead to
additional innovations, or even to copies of the current innovations.2 These knowl-
edge spillovers provide benefit to the public as a whole, but not to the innovator. As
a result, private firms do not have incentives to provide the socially optimal level
of research activity.
Much economic research has been done quantifying the effect of such spillovers.
Economists studying the returns to research consistently find that knowledge
spillovers result in a wedge between private and social rates return to R&D. Exam-
ples of such studies include Mansfield (1977, 1996), Pakes (1985), Jaffe (1986),
Hall (1996), and Jones and Williams (1998). Typical results include marginal social
rates of return between 30 and 50%. In comparison, estimates of private marginal
rates of return on investments range from 7 to 15% (Bazelon and Smetters, 1999;
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Jones and Williams, 1998; Hall 1996). Since firms make investment decisions based
on their private returns, the wedge between private and social rates of return sug-
gests socially beneficial research opportunities are being ignored by firms because
they are unable to fully capture the rewards of such innovations.
Because of knowledge spillovers, climate-friendly R&D will be underprovided
by market forces even if policies to correct the environmental externalities of emis-
sions, such as carbon taxes, are in place. Popp (2004) finds that the welfare gains
from an optimal carbon tax increase by seven percent when the tax is supplemented
with R&D subsidies sufficient to support all socially-efficient research. This sug-
gests two possible avenues through which policy can encourage the development
of environmentally-friendly technologies: correcting the environmental externality
and/or correcting knowledge market failures.
Not surprisingly, economic theory dictates that the socially optimal policy is
to address both market failures. Moreover, Schneider and Goulder (1997) show
that policies to address knowledge spillovers are more effective if they address all
knowledge spillovers, rather than focusing on R&D pertaining to alternative energy.
Nonetheless, as targeted R&D subsidies are likely to be more politically popular
than either broad-based R&D measures or restrictive emissions targets, it is useful
to explore the potential of each mechanism both individually and in tandem.
To address this question, I use the ENTICE-BR model of climate policy (Popp
forthcoming). ENTICE-BR extends the ENTICE model (Popp, 2004) to include
policy-induced R&D on both energy efficiency and a carbon-free backstop energy
technology source. Both ENTICE models build on the well-known DICE model
of climate change (Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). The DICE model
is a dynamic growth model of the global economy that includes links between
economic activity, carbon emissions, and the climate. Because it includes both
costs and benefits of climate change, it allows the modeler to simulate optimal
paths for control of carbon emissions. As such, unlike the analysis by Schneider
and Goulder, I am able to calculate optimal policies for both carbon taxes and R&D
subsidies. Moreover, I examine how the optimal policy for each changes depending
on whether the other market failure has also been addressed.
2. The ENTICE Model
To examine R&D policies to address climate change, one must use a climate policy
model that explicitly links climate policy and innovation. Typically, these mod-
els include such links in one of two ways. Bottom-up models include a detailed
specification of energy systems, but typically do not include detailed modeling of
the overall macroeconomy. Such models usually implement induced technological
change with a learning-by-doing framework, in which the costs of various tech-
nologies decrease with experience. Examples include Manne and Richels (2004),
Gru¨bler and Messner (1998), and Messner (1997). Because these models do not
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address the opportunity costs of any new research efforts, they tend to provide
overly optimistic results concerning the potential of technological change.3 Top-
down models focus on the links between environmental policy and macroeconomic
performance. Endogenous technological change in these models typically comes
through accumulated investment in research and development (R&D). Recent mod-
els of this nature include Goulder and Schneider (1999), Nordhaus (2002), and
Buonanno et al. (2003). In addition, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2003) endogenize
technological change in a top-down model using learning-by-doing. Of these mod-
els, only Goulder and Schneider and Gerlagh and van der Zwaan include a choice
of multiple energy technologies, including a carbon-free alternative.
The ENTICE-BR model belongs to this second group of models. It is a top-
down model providing explicit links between economic activity and environmental
damages. The model uses the basic dynamic growth model framework of the DICE
model (Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000), but includes explicit links
between climate policy and climate-friendly R&D.4 Climate-friendly R&D can
come in one of two forms: as R&D designed to improve overall energy efficiency,
or R&D that helps reduce the cost of the carbon-free energy source. The model is
calibrated to a base year of 1995, and is solved in 10-year increments for a period of
350 years. Figure 1 illustrates the logic of the ENTICE-BR model. Key equations
Figure 1. Schematic of the ENTICE-BR Model. Figure 1 illustrates the logic of the ENTICE-BR
model. Capital, labor and energy services are combined to produce output, which can be used for
consumption, or reinvested into energy R&D or other investment. As described in the text, energy
services combines two types of fuels (fossil fuels and a non-carbon backstop technology) and energy
efficiency technologies. The use of fossil fuels leads to increased atmospheric temperature, which
lowers output through a damage function.
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pertaining to the energy research sector are presented below. Interested readers are
referred to Popp (forthcoming, 2004) for more detailed presentation of the model
structure.
2.1. STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
In both the DICE and ENTICE models, the goal of the model is to maximize
the present value of per capita utility, which increases along with increased per
capita consumption, subject to various economic and environmental constraints.
One important difference between ENTICE and the original DICE model is that
energy use must enter the production function explicitly, so that the potential benefits
of energy saving research can be captured. As illustrated in Figure 1, total energy
services, which are defined below, are used along with capital and labor to produce
output. Defining output as Qt , labor as Lt , the physical capital stock, Kt , and effective
energy units, Et , the production function used in ENTICE-BR is:
Qt = At K γt L1−γ−βt Eβt − pF,t Ft − pB,t Bt (1)
Energy services include both fossil fuels, Ft , and backstop energy, Bt . Note that
the cost of both energy sources, pF,t and pB,t , are subtracted from final output, and
that both prices vary over time. Fossil fuels are measured in tons of carbon, so that
the price of fossil fuels is thus the price of energy that generates one ton of carbon
emissions.5 Backstop energy units are converted to represent the equivalence of one
ton of carbon-based energy, or carbon-ton equivalence (CTE). Their price is defined
below. The model is made dynamic by the various uses for output, which can satisfy
current consumption needs, or be invested into the physical capital stock or as energy
R&D.6 Energy R&D either increases the level of energy efficiency technology or
lowers the cost of the backstop technology. The environmental component of the
ENTICE-BR model links fossil fuel usage to increases in atmospheric temperature.
An associated damage function results in lower levels of output as temperature
increases.
As the main difference between the DICE model and ENTICE-BR is the en-
ergy research sector, I discuss those components of the model in greater detail.
Effective energy units, Et , uses a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
framework to aggregate the contributions of fossil fuels, the backstop energy source,
and knowledge pertaining to energy efficiency. The first nest, introduced in Popp
(2004), combines energy-efficiency knowledge and fuel consumption into the com-
posite input of effective energy units. The second nest, between fossil fuels and the
backstop technology, follows the work of van der Zwaan et al. (2002). This spec-
ification models the backstop and fossil fuels are imperfect substitutes, allowing
for the possibility of “niche markets” for the backstop technology even when the
price of the backstop exceeds fossil fuel prices. In each nest, the ease of substitution
is represented by ρi . The case of perfect substitution is ρi = 1. The elasticity of
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Equation (2) states that the total energy requirements for production must be
met either by the use of fossil fuel or by technological advances that substitute for
fossil fuels. Note that technology affects Equation (2) in one of two ways. HE ,t
represents technological advances that replace fuels in production, and can thus be
thought of as improvements to energy efficiency. This stock of knowledge responds
endogenously to changes in policy, through an invention possibilities frontier that
is described below. αH is a scaling factor that determines the level of energy savings
resulting from new knowledge.7
In addition, technology influences the level of the backstop technology cho-
sen by lowering the cost of this input. The backstop technology represents energy
sources, such as wind or solar power, that are assumed abundant, and thus avail-
able at constant marginal cost. Currently, the high costs of these technologies limit
their potential contribution to energy consumption. However, we expect that tech-
nological advances will lower their costs over time. Defining HB ,t as the stock of
knowledge pertaining to the backstop, and using η to represent the relationship
between new knowledge and prices, the backstop price at time t is:
pB,t = PB,0HηB,t
(3)
The contribution of new energy R&D to the knowledge stocks HE,t and HB,t is
determined by an invention possibilities frontier, which translates R&D into new
contributions to knowledge. Knowledge is cumulative, so that these contributions
are added to the previous knowledge stock. Defining Ri,t as R&D on research for
each technology at time t, the knowledge stocks are given as
Hi,t = a Rbii,t Hφi,t + (1 − δH ) · Hi,t−1, i = E, B (4)
Because the model is solved in 10-year increments, Equation (4) assumes that
the main impact of a new technology occurs within 10 years. This is consistent
with empirical work on the effect of energy R&D (Popp, 2001), as well as broader
studies on rates of diffusion (see, for example, the results cited in Karshenas and
Stoneman, 1995). I assume that both bi and φi lie between 0 and 1. As discussed
in Popp (2004), φi < 1 assumes there are diminishing returns to research across
time. Since energy R&D is specialized within a given field, it becomes more and
more difficult to find new inventions as the knowledge frontier moves out. Popp
(2002) provides supporting evidence. Similarly, b < 0 assumes diminishing returns
to research at any given time.
Finally, because of the public goods nature of knowledge, the role of market
failures in R&D must be considered. As noted earlier, virtually all empirical studies
of R&D find that the social returns to R&D are greater than the private returns to
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R&D. Since firms will invest until the private rates of return to R&D are equal to
the rates of returns on other investments, underinvestment in R&D will occur. I
model these positive externalities by constraining the social rate of return for R&D
to be four times that of investment in physical capital.
This constraint provides an additional avenue through which policymakers can
influence R&D. High social rates of return to R&D occur because knowledge
spillovers prevent firms from capturing the entire economic return on their inno-
vations. Governments can close the gap between the social rate of return on R&D
and other investments by subsidizing R&D.8 In principle, governments desiring
to enhance efficiency would subsidize R&D until R&D levels increase enough so
that the marginal gains from an additional dollar of R&D are no greater than the
marginal gains from a dollar invested elsewhere in the economy. Removing the rate
of return constraint assumes that government policies, such as R&D subsidies, are
in place to correct market failures in the research sector.
In addition, since empirical work suggests that at least some energy R&D will
come at the expense of other forms of R&D,9 we need to account for the opportunity
cost of R&D. Since the social rate of return on R&D is four times higher that of
other investment, losing a dollar of other R&D has the same effect as losing four
dollars of other investments. This is modeled by subtracting four dollars of private
investment from the physical capital stock for each dollar of R&D crowded out by
energy R&D, so that the net capital stock is:
Kt = {It − 4 ∗crowdout∗ (RE,t + RB,t )} + (1 − δ)Kt−1, (5)
where crowdout represents the percentage of other R&D crowded out by energy
R&D, It represents investment in physical capital, and δ is the depreciation rate of
capital over time.10
2.2. CALIBRATION
Before presenting the results of simulations, it is first necessary to discuss the
values used for key parameters in the equations above. As mentioned earlier, the
model is calibrated using 1995 as the base year. Parameters are chosen so that out-
put and emissions closely match the results of the basic DICE model (Nordhaus,
1994; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000), as discussed in Popp (2004). Of particular im-
portance to the following analysis are the values of parameters used to model
energy consumption and R&D. I highlight these key values below. Readers inter-
ested in more details on calibration are referred to the appendix.11 Key parameters
include:
• ρH and ρB , the substitution parameters in Equation (2),
• η, describing the relationship between knowledge and backstop prices in
Equation (3),
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• a, b, and φ: parameters in the invention possibilities frontier (4), and
• αH , the scaling factor for the effect of energy-efficiency human capital.
As shown in Popp (forthcoming, 2004), the results of the ENTICE model are
most sensitive to changes in ρH and ρB . Increases in these parameters lead to
increases in the amount of R&D induced by changes in the price of fossil fuels
(such as a carbon tax). Climate policies are less costly when more R&D is induced.
Based on Popp (2002), I choose ρH so that the model produces an elasticity of
energy-efficiency R&D with respect to energy prices of 0.35 for the base model.12
Unlike ρH , the value of ρB , is not freely chosen. Because it describes the substi-
tutability between fossil fuels and the backstop technology, its value is determined
by the starting price of the backstop technology. Unfortunately, a wide range of
possibilities for the starting price exists. Popp (forthcoming) presents sensitivity
analysis for three initial price levels, $400, $1200, and $2000 per carbon ton equiv-
alent (CTE) of backstop energy.13 Because the model is most sensitive to lowering
the backstop price, in this paper I focus on the mid-range value of $1200 per car-
bon ton equivalent of backstop energy, as well as the low initial backstop price of
$400/CTE of backstop energy. As noted in Popp (forthcoming), the resulting elas-
ticity of substitution (ρB) using this low starting price yields very high elasticities
of R&D, and should be considered an optimistic alternative.
Next, I choose a value for η, which relates increases in backstop R&D to backstop
price decreases. Unfortunately, no good empirical estimates of this parameter exist.
Popp (forthcoming) presents results for two values, 0.5 and 1.0. These yield progress
ratios of 24 and 50% respectively. A 50% progress means that a doubling of the
knowledge stock reduces the backstop price by 50%. I use the 24% progress ratio
as the base case, as Popp (forthcoming) shows that the marginal returns to R&D
are more realistic when using this value.
I choose parameters for the inventions possibility frontier to satisfy the following
conditions. First, I choose a value for a so that the change in energy R&D between
1995 and 2005 in the optimal policy simulation is consistent with the elasticity of
0.35. Values of b and φ are then chosen so that future elasticities fit the desired
time path – falling slowly in the near future due to diminishing returns to R&D, as
suggested in Popp (2002). Finally, I calibrate the scaling factor αH so that a dollar
of new energy R&D results in four dollars of energy savings, as suggested in Popp
(2001).
3. Simulations
Because the ENTICE-BR model includes environmental damages, it can be used to
calculate an optimal climate policy in which marginal benefits equal marginal costs.
Such a policy meets a benefit-cost criterion of maximizing total net benefits, and is
equivalent to using carbon taxes to correct the environmental externality described
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in Section 1.14 In addition, removing the constraint that the rate of return of energy
R&D be four times that of other investment is equivalent to using policy to correct
market failures for R&D, such as government funded R&D that supplements private
R&D effort.15 In this section, I use the model described above to compare the effects
of alleviating one or both of these market failures. I begin by summarizing the main
results of using an optimal carbon tax, which corrects the environmental externality,
but does not address knowledge spillovers. I then consider how the results change
when R&D subsidies are used to correct the market failures resulting from knowl-
edge spillovers. Next, I examine sensitivity of the results to key assumptions in the
model. Finally, because the level of emissions reductions resulting from an optimal
tax is lower than often proposed by policymakers, I also consider whether R&D
subsidies affect the desirability of more restrictive emissions reduction proposals.
3.1. OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Popp (forthcoming) presents the results of a simulated optimal carbon tax without
R&D subsidies. As is typical of economic models that solve for an optimal climate
policy, the results recommend that climate policy proceed slowly. Because carbon
emissions stay in the atmosphere for a long period of time, the marginal damage
from any additional ton of emissions is low. Thus, gradually phasing in carbon
reduction lowers the opportunity cost of reducing emissions without having much
impact on the global climate. Figure 2 shows the carbon tax for the first 100 years.
The tax starts at a value of $10.30 per ton carbon (tC) in 2005,16 and rises to
$72.59/tC by 2105. To compare the magnitude of the tax to other policy goals,
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) calculate a tax of $52.48/tC to restrict emissions to
1990 levels, and a carbon tax of $267.69/tC in 2105 to limit concentrations to twice
those of preindustrial levels. Similarly, using the DEMETER model, Gerlagh and
van der Zwaan calculate a tax of $10/tC in 2000 and taxes ranging from $400/tC
to $600/tC in 2100 to limit temperature increases to two degrees Celsius.
The emissions reductions resulting from this carbon tax can be found by com-
paring the lines for business as usual (BAU) and optimal tax in Figure 3. Compared
to BAU, carbon emissions under an optimal carbon tax fall by just 3.2% in 2005, by
5.4% in 2025, and by 15.4% in 2105.17 As a result of this, atmospheric temperature
continues to rise, although at a slightly slower pace, as shown in Figure 4. Here, and
in the figures that follow, solid lines illustrate results under BAU, and dashed lines
results using an optimal carbon tax only. Lines marked with additional symbols
show results from a simulation also including R&D subsidies. These are discussed
in Section 3.2.
Table I and Figure 5 show R&D spending on energy efficiency and the backstop
technology (as well as under the R&D subsidy policy to be discussed below). In the
base year (1995), there are $10 billion of energy R&D, and $1 billion of backstop
energy R&D.18 Based on results from Popp (2002), the model is calibrated so that
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Figure 2. Optimal Carbon Tax rates.
Figure 3. Carbon Emissions Under Optimal Climate Policies. The figure shows annual carbon emis-
sions under both business and usual (BAU) and an optimal carbon tax policy. Note that R&D subsidies,
by themselves, result in very small reductions in emissions. This is true in both the BAU and optimal
tax simulations. Policies aimed directly at emissions are needed to achieve reductions.
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Figure 4. Atmospheric Temperature Under Optimal Climate Policies. The figure shows how the
departure of global mean temperature from 1990 levels, reported in degrees Celsius is affected by
carbon taxes and/or R&D subsidies. As with emissions, R&D subsidies by themselves have little
effect on temperature.
the initial elasticity of energy R&D with respect to energy prices is 0.35, and so that
the elasticity falls over time due to diminishing returns to research, as discussed in
Section 2. This results in $13 billion of energy efficiency R&D in 2005, and $1.37
billion of backstop energy R&D in 2005 under the optimal policy.
Finally, it is useful to consider the overall economic impact of the carbon tax.
I calculate the net economic impact as the present value of consumption with
policy minus the present value of consumption under BAU for the 350 years of the
ENTICE simulation. Simply correcting the environmental externality through an
optimal carbon tax increases welfare by $2.31 trillion over the time frame of the
simulation.
3.2. R&D SUBSIDIES
The above results correct show the effects of policy designed to correct the environ-
mental externality market failure. However, as discussed in Section 2, the potential
of R&D to reduce the costs of complying with climate change is limited by ad-
ditional market failures for R&D. Because firms cannot fully capture the social
benefits of their research, they will underinvest in energy (and other) R&D. The
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TABLE I
Energy R&D Spending Over Time
2005 2025 2055 2105
Energy Efficiency R&D
BAU 13.08 19.67 26.37 37.96
Subsidy 0 2.02 5.85 11.57
Total w/R&D subsidies 13.08 21.69 32.22 49.53
optimal tax 13.28 19.91 26.88 38.89
Subsidy 0.13 2.46 6.56 12.11
Total w/R&D subsidies 13.41 22.37 33.44 51.00
Backstop R&D
BAU 1.28 1.70 2.27 3.43
Subsidy 0.06 0.23 0.66 1.73
Total w/R&D subsidies 1.34 1.93 2.93 5.16
optimal tax 1.37 1.83 2.44 3.61
Subsidy 0.07 0.29 0.81 2.06
Total w/R&D subsidies 1.44 2.12 3.25 5.67
Percent Change from BAU
Energy Efficiency R&D
BAU N/A N/A N/A N/A
W/R&D subsidies 0.0% 10.3% 22.2% 30.5%
optimal tax 1.5% 1.2% 1.9% 2.4%
W/R&D subsidies 2.5% 13.7% 26.8% 34.4%
Backstop R&D
BAU N/A N/A N/A N/A
w/R&D subsidies 4.7% 13.5% 29.1% 50.4%
optimal tax 7.0% 7.6% 7.5% 5.2%
w/R&D subsidies 12.5% 24.7% 43.2% 65.3%
Table I presents levels of energy R&D spending over time, in billions of 1990 US dollars. BAU shows
R&D spending under business as usual without any R&D subsidies. Subsidy shows the amount of
R&D subsidy that addresses knowledge spillovers, but not the environmental externality, and BAU
with R&D subsidies presents the combined total of BAU R&D and the subsidy. Similarly, optimal tax
shows R&D levels under a carbon tax designed to correct the environmental externality, but without
R&D policy to address knowledge spillovers. Here, subsidy shows the level of R&D subsidies needed
to address both the environmental and knowledge market failures, and optimal tax with R&D subsidies
shows the total R&D (including subsidies) when the policy is in place. Finally, the bottom half of the
table shows the increase from BAU R&D for each policy scenario.
main contribution of this paper is to ask how, if at all, the potential of R&D changes
when such market failures are corrected. This section evaluates the potential of
government R&D subsidies as part of a climate policy scenario.
Because two market failures, the environmental externality and knowledge
spillovers, need to be corrected, there are three possible policies to consider. They
differ by addressing either one or both of these two market failures. First, one could
imagine a policy that simply corrects the knowledge spillover problem, but ignores
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Figure 5. Energy R&D Under Optimal Climate Policies. Panel a shows the level of backstop energy
R&D, and panel b the level of energy efficiency R&D, both in billions of 1990 US dollars. As can
be seen by comparing the BAU and optimal tax lines with and without subsidies, policies that correct
R&D market failures induce more additional R&D than does the carbon tax itself.
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the environmental externality. This would be equivalent to removing the rate of
return constraint in ENTICE-BR, but not implementing a carbon tax. While such a
policy corrects for knowledge spillovers, it ignores the environmental benefits that
emerge from energy R&D. Second, the government could use R&D subsidies that
consider both the social benefits of knowledge spillovers and the environmental ben-
efits provided by the R&D. Such subsidies will, of course, be greater than the subsi-
dies under the first policy option. In this case, the total level of R&D would be equiv-
alent to the R&D under a carbon tax with the rate of return constraint removed.19
Finally, rather than using R&D subsidies in isolation, the government can use sub-
sidies in tandem with an optimal carbon tax. Such a policy would be preferred to
either using a carbon tax or subsidies alone, as it addresses both market failures.20
Table I and Figure 5 show R&D spending on energy efficiency and the back-
stop technology under the various policy scenarios, as well as the percentage by
which R&D increases from BAU under each policy scenario. In the table, BAU with
R&D subsidies represents the first policy discussed above, in which only knowl-
edge spillovers are considered. Optimal tax with R&D subsidies gives the level of
R&D under both the second and third policies discussed above, in which subsi-
dies address both the environmental externality and knowledge spillovers. In the
base year (1995), there are $10 billion of energy R&D, and $1 billion of backstop
energy R&D.21 In the short run, simply implementing an optimal tax increases
R&D more than correcting R&D market failures. For example, compared to BAU,
backstop R&D increases by 7 percent under the carbon tax (which corrects the
environmental externality, but not the spillover problem), but just 4.7 percent in the
BAU scenario with R&D subsidies (which corrects the spillover problem, but not
the environmental externality).
However, while the percentage of R&D induced by the carbon tax remains
relatively constant over time, the percentage subsidy required to equate private and
social returns to R&D grows. Each additional R&D dollar not only benefits current
consumers, but also provides additional building blocks for future research. Thus, as
shown in the figures, the major difference in long run R&D comes from correcting
the spillover problem, rather than the environmental externality. By the middle
of the century, the optimal R&D subsidy is 43 percent higher than BAU R&D.
Furthermore, after correcting for knowledge spillovers, the additional increment to
R&D from also acknowledging the environmental externality is small, as shown by
the differences between the lines labeled BAU with R&D subsidies and optimal tax
with R&D subsidies in Figure 5. There is a larger difference between R&D with and
without subsidies under BAU (or under an optimal tax policy) than there is between
R&D with and without a tax when a subsidy is in place. Thus, while climate policy
will induce some increases in climate-friendly R&D, the most significant gains to
R&D spending come from directly addressing the market failures resulting from
knowledge spillovers.
Nonetheless, note from Figures 3 and 4 that while subsidies do increase energy
R&D in the long-run, they have little impact on other important variables. Recall
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that, in these figures, the two solid lines show emissions under BAU and the dashed
lines show emissions with the optimal carbon tax. Symbols mark the lines repre-
senting policies with R&D subsidies. These figures emphasize the importance of
environmental policy for reducing emissions. While there is a significant drop in
emissions between any BAU scenario versus any carbon tax scenario, there is almost
no change in emissions under BAU versus BAU with R&D subsidies only. Simi-
larly, the addition of R&D subsidies does not lead to further emissions reductions
after a carbon tax is in place. Of course, similar trends hold for temperature.
Moreover, using R&D subsidies leads to virtually no change the optimal level
of the carbon tax, which remains within one-half of one percent of its original level
after subsidies are included. The carbon tax rate is based on the marginal damage
of emissions. The marginal damage curve for carbon emissions in any given year
is relatively flat, as one additional ton of carbon is just a small addition to total
concentrations. While R&D allows emissions reductions to be achieved at lower
cost, it does not change the marginal benefits gained from reducing emissions, which
is the avoided marginal damage. A tax set at this level is still necessary to force
consumers and producers to consider the environmental costs of their actions when
consuming fossil fuels. While R&D subsidies can augment other environmental
policy, and can help lower the costs of complying with these policies, they cannot
serve as a substitute for policies designed to restrict emissions!22
As would be expected, with such small impacts on emissions, the effects of R&D
subsidies on overall economic welfare are also small. Table II shows the welfare
gains from four separate policies: R&D subsidies only, optimal R&D subsidies
TABLE II
Welfare Gains
Gain from BAU % of maximum welfare gain
Optimal tax & R&D subsidies 2.43 100%
Optimal tax only 2.31 95%
Optimal R&D subsidies only 0.27 11%
R&D subsidies only 0.23 9%
Restrict emissions & R&D subsidies −3.61 −148%
Restrict emissions to 1995 levels −3.75 −154%
Backstop mandate & R&D subsidies 1.68 69%
Backstop mandate 1.57 64%
Table II summarizes the welfare gains under various optimal emissions policies, as well as under two
alternative policies discussed in Section 3.4. Net economic welfare is measured as the difference in
the present value of consumption between a policy and BAU simulation, and is presented in trillions
of 1990 US dollars. The maximum welfare gain comes from a combination of optimal carbon taxes
and R&D subsidies, as this addresses both market failures. Note that R&D subsidies themselves do
not enhance welfare as much as policies that directly deal with the environmental externality from
carbon emissions.
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only, an optimal tax only, or both an optimal tax and optimal R&D subsidies. Of
course, the maximum welfare gain is achieved when policy addresses both market
failures. In this case, welfare improves by $2.43 trillion during the period of the
simulation. As shown in the table, most of this increase comes from the carbon tax.
A carbon tax alone achieves 95% of these welfare gains. However, R&D subsidies
alone achieve just 10% of the maximum welfare gain.
The above results suggest that R&D subsidies can be a useful complement to
other environmental policies, but do not have the ability to address the climate
change problem alone. Thus, while policymakers may find it politically expedient
to fall back on proposals for increased research efforts to confront climate change,
significant progress cannot be made without complementary policies in place to
restrict emissions. There are two reasons for the limited potential of R&D subsidies.
Most importantly, R&D subsidies address market failures in the invention of new
technologies, but do not provide incentives to adopt new technologies. Consider, for
example, Figure 6, which shows the percentage of energy coming from backstop
sources. Compared to BAU, this percentage increases by about five percentage
points under a carbon tax. However, there is almost no change in the percentage
when comparing BAU with and without R&D subsidies.
Figure 6. Percentage of Energy From Backstop Sources. The figure shows the percentage of energy
from backstop sources under BAU or an optimal carbon tax. As with emissions, a policy addressing
carbon emissions directly, such as a carbon tax, is necessary to increase this percentage. There is
almost no change between BAU and BAU with R&D subsidies.
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A second limitation of R&D subsidies comes from the opportunity costs of
R&D. R&D is performed by highly trained scientists and engineers. Shifting more
resources towards one type of research results in fewer resources available for
other research opportunities. For example, Goolsbee (1998) finds that one of the
chief beneficiaries of R&D tax subsidies are scientists and engineers, as increased
demand for their services leads to higher wages. Similarly, in Popp (2004), I present
evidence that approximately one-half of the energy R&D spending that took place
in the 1970s and 1980s came at the expense of other R&D. This lost R&D comes
at a high cost. Because of market failures for knowledge, the social returns to R&D
are high for all types of R&D, not just for energy R&D. Recall from Section 2 that
the consensus from studies on the returns to R&D is that the social rates of return
are approximately four times higher than the rates of return to other investments.
Thus, taking one dollar from other R&D projects has the same effect as taking four
dollars from other types of investments. Indeed, the socially optimal level of R&D
subsidies found by the ENTICE-BR model account for this, as the rates of return
to R&D remain twice that of other investment even after the constraint requiring
the returns to be four times higher is removed.23 If the government ignores these
social costs, and subsidizes energy R&D until its rate of return is equal to that of
other investments, net economic welfare actually falls due to the lost value of other
R&D. This result suggests that large-scale increases in energy R&D budgets, such
as suggested by the 1999 PCAST report, will have significant macroeconomic costs
unless accompanied by other initiatives designed to reduce the effects of crowding
out. Examples of such initiatives could include expanded resources for training of
scientists and engineers, so that new researchers come from an expanded pool of
scientists, rather than from other disciplines. Of course, efforts to increase the pool
of available scientists take time, suggesting that rapid increases in R&D budgets
should be avoided.
3.3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The small role that R&D subsidies play in the ENTICE-BR model may come as
a surprise to many climate researchers. To better understand the limits to R&D
subsidies as climate policy, in this Section I examine the sensitivity of the model to
various key assumptions of the model. These are: (1) a lower initial backstop price
of $400, (2) increasing the progress ratio for backstop price decreases to 50 percent,
(3) doubling the value of b in the invention possibilities frontier (equation (4)) for
each type of energy R&D, (4) raising the value of φ in the invention possibilities
frontier, (5) raising to eight the deviation between social and private rates of return
on R&D, (6) raising to eight the deviation between social and private rates of
return for energy R&D only, (7) assuming no crowding out of other R&D, and (8)
assuming both a lower backstop price and no crowding out of R&D.24 I focus on
how changing these parameters affects the prospects for R&D subsidies. Thus, I
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first show how changes in these parameters affect the magnitude of R&D subsidies,
followed by the effects of changes on overall economic welfare. Readers interested
in a more general discussion of the effects of changing parameters on other outputs
of the model are referred to Popp (forthcoming).
Figure 7 shows the percentage of each type energy R&D that is subsidized
(e.g. funded by the government) under each scenario. For backstop R&D, note
that assumptions about the initial backstop price (and consequently the elasticity of
substitution between energy sources) have by far the biggest impact on subsidies. A
lower backstop price means that alternative energy sources are closer to becoming
competitive with fossil fuels. Whereas increased R&D cannot do enough to make
the backstop competitive with a starting price of $1200, increased R&D can increase
the speed at which the backstop becomes competitive at the lower starting price of
$400.25 Moreover, the elasticity of substitution implied by this price suggests that
the backstop and fossil fuels are better substitutes. Both of these features make near-
term backstop R&D much more attractive with the lower starting price. Except for
doubling b, all other changes mentioned above also increase backstop subsidies, but
by smaller amounts. The next largest changes come from raising φ and by assuming
no crowding out of R&D.
In contrast, removing assumptions about crowding out have the biggest impact
on energy efficiency subsidies. The next biggest impact is for raising the deviation
between social and private rates of return, but the effect of this change is about 10
percent of the effect of removing crowding out. Interestingly, making the backstop
more attractive by lowering its price makes subsidies for energy efficiency less
attractive, as more resources are devoted to promoting the backstop technology
instead.
Figure 8 shows the net welfare gains for an optimal tax policy, both with and
without R&D subsidies, for each of these assumptions, as well as the welfare gains
from subsidies without climate policy. Here we see four sets of assumptions where
the welfare effects of an optimal policy change significantly: a low backstop price,
high social returns to energy R&D only, no crowding out, and the low price/no
crowding out combination. For the others, note that while changing these parameters
changes the effects of energy R&D, energy R&D is a small part of the total economy.
Moreover, changing the parameters of the invention possibilities frontier affects
both the baseline and policy case, so that energy R&D also becomes more desirable
even without policy. Finally, except for the case where a low initial price makes the
backstop more attractive, the optimal emissions profile does not change much, so
that any gains that do occur result in more output, rather than changes in climate.26
The figure also verifies the importance of crowding out as a limitation to R&D
subsidies. Removing the assumption of partial crowding out of R&D makes R&D
subsidies more attractive. In fact, R&D subsidies alone increase welfare by more
than the optimal tax alone in the case with no crowding out.
Finally, it is worth considering what many observers would argue is the “special
nature” of energy R&D. Many researchers in the climate change field advocate
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Figure 7. Percentage of R&D Subsidized With Optimal Subsidy Rates. Panel a shows the percentage
of backstop energy R&D supported by subsidies, and panel b shows the same percentage for energy
efficiency R&D. For backstop R&D, assumptions about the initial backstop price lead to the largest
increase in subsidies. In contrast, energy efficiency R&D falls as the backstop price is lowered, as
resources are shifted from energy efficiency R&D to backstop R&D. In both cases, assumptions about
crowding out and the returns to energy R&D are important.
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Figure 8. Sensitivity Analysis of Welfare Gains. The figure examines the sensitivity of welfare gains
under various assumptions, with the gains expressed in trillions of 1990 U.S. dollars. Except for
simulations with no crowding out or high returns to energy R&D, subsidies remain ineffective when
not paired with policies specifically designed to reduce emissions.
a major role for R&D subsidies, arguing that the long-term payoffs, uncertain
nature, and sheer size of the R&D projects necessary to create these new energy
technologies make such R&D unprofitable for private firms.27 One way to address
this in the ENTICE-BR model is to assume that the social rate of return on energy
R&D is higher than on other R&D.28 Thus, I re-run the model, assuming that
the gap between social and private rates of return for energy R&D is eight times
that of other investments, but maintain the four times gap for other R&D. As
shown in Figure 8, R&D subsidies do play a larger role in this case, as the welfare
gain of an optimal carbon tax policy nearly doubles from $2.49 trillion without
R&D subsidies to $4.21 trillion when R&D subsidies are also included in the
policy mix. Moreover, in this case subsidies alone raise welfare by $2.18 trillion.
Raising the social returns also increases the size of the optimal subsidy, as shown
in Figure 7. In the near term, the largest gains are for energy efficiency subsidies,
as the payoff of such gains appears more quickly with the base value of $1200
for a starting backstop price.29 Thus, advocates of large increases in energy R&D
may be justified if they can successfully argue that the social benefits (net of any
potential environmental gains) of energy R&D are truly greater than other types of
R&D.
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3.4. OTHER CLIMATE POLICIES
By implementing an optimal carbon tax, the above simulation shows the maximum
possible gains to economic welfare from correcting the market failures concerning
emissions and R&D. However, most discussions of climate policy revolve around
more restrictive policies that set fixed emissions levels. Thus, I consider the inter-
action of R&D subsidies with two additional policies – one restricting emissions
to 1995 levels, and a second mandating at least 10 percent of energy come from
backstop sources.30 The policy mandating backstop energy retains a carbon tax as
well, so that climate policies are in place even after backstop prices fall to a level
where a government mandate is not needed to encourage 10% market penetration.
Figure 9 compares atmospheric temperature under the BAU scenario and each
of our three policy scenarios. For each policy scenario, results are presented for
policies that also include R&D subsidies. As before, these subsidies have little effect
on the value of variables other than R&D, so that the results without subsidies are
similar. Requiring 10% of total energy to come from backstop sources slightly
lowers atmospheric temperature in the short run, but has little long-term effect.
Figure 9. Temperature Under Various Policy Scenarios. The figure shows the departure of global
mean temperature from 1990 levels, reported in degrees Celsius, under various policy scenarios.
In each case, both emissions reduction policies and R&D subsidies are used. While the backstop
mandate has little effect on long-run atmospheric temperature, restricting emissions to 1995 levels
reduces long-run temperature by over one degree Celsius compared to BAU.
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Figure 10. Percentage of Energy From Backstop Sources Under Various Policy Scenarios. The figure
shows the percentage of energy from backstop sources under various policy scenarios. Note that the
backstop mandate increases backstop usage in the short-run, but has little long run effect.
As shown in Figure 10, which illustrates the percentage of energy coming from
backstop sources under each policy, the mandate merely speeds up the time it takes
for backstop market penetration to reach 10%. Once this occurs, the mandate has no
additional effect, and usage patterns mirror those of the optimal carbon tax policy.
In contrast, restricting emissions to 1995 levels lowers atmospheric temperature
nearly one degree Celsius more than either the optimal tax or backstop mandate
policies. However, this drop in temperature comes at a cost. As shown in Table II,
restricting emissions to 1995 levels has a negative impact on net economic welfare
– the potential benefits of reduced emissions do not justify the costs of reducing
emissions quickly. Recall from Figure 3 that an optimal climate policy entails a
gradual emissions reduction. Acting quickly forces short-term reductions before
technology has had a chance to evolve and lower the costs of action.
Turning to R&D, note that while R&D subsidies increase both backstop and
energy efficiency R&D under these alternative polices, the impact of this additional
R&D is generally negligible. Figure 11 shows backstop and energy efficiency R&D
under each policy scenario, both with and without subsidies. Not surprisingly,
the restrictive policy induces the most R&D, particularly for backstop energy. As
before, the biggest jumps in R&D come not from environmental policy, but from
the subsidies themselves.
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Figure 11. Energy R&D Under Alternative Climate Policies. The figure shows the level of backstop
energy R&D (Panel A) and energy efficiency R&D (Panel B) in billions of 1990 US dollars, under
various policy scenarios.
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Nonetheless, once again R&D subsidies have little impact on emissions or tem-
perature. In fact, under the restricted emissions case, there is no change in tempera-
ture when R&D subsidies are added to the policy, since the climate policy offers no
incentives for reductions beyond what is initially mandated, even as subsidies im-
prove the quality of technology. In this case, the only benefits from additional R&D
come from cost savings. Faster development of new technologies makes meeting a
fixed emissions target cheaper. As a result, the carbon tax needed to meet this goal
falls by 14 percent in 2005, and by five percent in 2025. Such results are consistent
with the predictions of Goulder and Mathai (2000) in the case of a cost-effective
policy designed to meet a given goal at the least possible cost.
However, under both the restricted emissions and backstop mandate policies, the
benefits of these cost savings are small compared to the direct effect of addressing
the environmental externality through policy. In each case, R&D subsidies only
improve net economic welfare by a few percentage points, as shown in Table II.
Not only do R&D subsidies not effectively address the climate change problem
on their own, they also have little ability to soften the economic costs of more
restrictive climate policies.31
4. Discussion
This paper examines the potential role that subsidies for climate-friendly R&D
may play in policy designed to reduce carbon emissions. Because firms are not
fully compensated for the social benefits of knowledge spillovers, they perform less
R&D than is socially optimal. R&D subsidies, either through direct government
funding of R&D or through tax credits for private R&D activity, can help raise R&D
levels to a socially desirable level. Indeed, the results show that such subsidies do
have a significant effect on the long run levels of energy R&D. Moreover, in the
long-run subsidies induce more R&D than a carbon tax does.
However, R&D subsidies cannot serve as a substitute for other climate poli-
cies. While R&D levels rise dramatically when subsidies are included in the policy
simulations, there is little change to other variables. Most importantly, since the
subsidies do not provide incentive to adopt new technologies, emissions do not
fall unless subsidies are accompanied by a policy to address the environmental
externality created by carbon emissions, such as a carbon tax. Moreover, for poli-
cies designed to meet a benefit-cost criterion, using subsidies does not change the
optimal level of the carbon tax, as the marginal benefits of reduced emissions do
not change. In contrast, under a cost-effective criterion, designed to meet a fixed
emissions target at the least possible cost, R&D subsidies lower the tax level needed
to achieve the desired emissions reductions. In both cases, while properly targeted
R&D subsidies can lower the cost of such policies somewhat, as shown by the five
percent welfare gain from the policy using both a tax and subsidies in Section 3.2,
the biggest gains to both welfare and the environment come from policies designed
to target emissions directly.
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Finally, when setting the level of R&D subsidies, policy makers need to con-
sider the opportunity cost of additional R&D. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the
potential opportunity costs of R&D are a major limiting factor of the potential of
subsidies. Because R&D requires highly trained personnel, at least some new en-
ergy R&D efforts will likely come at the expense of other R&D. Just as spillovers
make the social returns to energy R&D high, they also make the social returns
to other types of R&D high. Thus, some of the large social benefits of additional
energy R&D are offset by large opportunity costs from giving up other types of
R&D spending. Ignoring the costs of reducing these R&D efforts would result in
overly generous subsidies for energy R&D, and could have negative impacts on the
economy as a whole.
These results have important implications for those on both sides of the policy
debate. For those who advocate that climate policy should proceed slowly, the lim-
itations of R&D suggest that technological change is unlikely to reduce the burden
of costly climate policies by significant amounts. On the other hand, the results also
offer support for those that argue that quick, strict emissions reductions are needed.
For example, the go-slow approach suggested by the DICE model is partially a
result of assumptions about the potential damages from climate emissions (see, for
example, Kaufmann, 1997). For those who think the damages are higher, and that
strict carbon policies are justified, the results show that R&D policy alone cannot
substitute for high carbon taxes or strict emissions limits if significant emissions
reductions are to be achieved. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis suggests advocates
of large increases in energy R&D spending may be justified if they can show that
the social returns to such R&D truly are larger than those of other types of R&D.
Nonetheless, in any of these cases, while R&D subsidies can be useful to lower
the cost of any given emissions target, they do not eliminate the need for such a
target, nor for continued debate over the stringency that emissions limits should
take.
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Notes
1Even when this market failure is not addressed, there will likely exist some incentives to develop
technologies that reduce carbon emissions. The market failure problem means that individuals do not
consider the social benefits of using technologies that reduce emissions. However, such technologies
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may also come with private benefits – for example, reduced gasoline expenditures from switching to
a hybrid-powered automobile.
2Intellectual property rights, such as patents, are designed to protect inventors from such
copies. However, their effectiveness varies depending on the ease in which inventors may “invent
around” the patent by making minor modifications to an invention. See, for example, Levin et al.
(1987).
3See Popp (2004, 2005) for a discussion.
4As noted above, one could also endogenize technology using a learning-by-doing approach. I
focus on R&D as the method of technological progress to examine the importance of the opportunity
costs of such R&D spending. Because R&D investments typically have higher social returns than
other investments, any new climate-friendly R&D that comes at the expense of other R&D will come
at a greater cost than R&D that displaces other investment. Should learning-by-doing serve as a
complement to R&D, the costs found in this paper could be viewed as an upper bound of the costs of
energy R&D. While empirical work on the role of learning-by-doing versus R&D for reducing energy
costs is limited, preliminary work such as Klaasen et al. (2003), So¨derholm and Sundqvist (2003),
and So¨derholm and Klaasen (2003) suggests R&D, rather than learning-by-doing, contributes more
to cost reductions.
5Following Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), the price of one ton of carbon energy from fossil fuels is
the sum of the marginal cost of carbon extraction, and a markup that captures the difference between
consumer prices and the marginal costs of extraction. Defining CumCt as cumulative carbon extraction
up to year t , and CumC∗ as the maximum possible extraction, the price of energy per ton of carbon
emissions at any given time is PF,t = 276.29 + 700[CumCt /CumC∗]4.
6As in the basic DICE model, other types of R&D are treated exogenously, and simply modeled
as increases in the productivity of all inputs over time.
7Technology also enters exogenously through t , which represents exogenous changes in the
ratio of carbon emissions per unit of carbon services. Examples include changes in consumption
patterns and switching to less carbon-intensive fossil fuels, such as natural gas. The role of exogenous
technological change is explored more fully in Popp (2004). This remaining technological change is
retained so that emissions in the baseline (no policy) simulation with R&D replicate the results of the
DICE model without R&D. The R&D modeled in the ENTICE models captures purposeful short-
term efforts to improve energy efficiency or lower the costs of the backstop technology. However,
such R&D is not the only way in which carbon intensity falls over time. Because the DICE model
and its variants are a one-sector macroeconomic growth model, changes in consumption patterns or
substitution among types of fossil fuels are not explicitly modeled. As a result, long-run emissions
simulated without any exogenous decline in carbon-intensity are unrealistically high. Fortunately,
Popp (2004) shows that the percentage of exogenous technological change remaining does not affect
the net economic impact of induced technological change, as it is the level of R&D induced between
an exogenous and endogenous R&D simulation that is important. Changing the scaling factor only
changes the level of emissions in each simulation, but not the difference between results in simulations
with and without climate policy.
8These subsidies could be direct (e.g. government funding of R&D) or indirect (e.g. tax credits for
privately financed R&D). As the ENTICE model is a one-sector macroeconomic model, the specific
method of subsidizing R&D is not specified. Rather, I report the increased level of R&D that occurs
after subsidies are in place. Moreover, there is no explicit government budget constraint, so that
all government revenues for subsidies can be viewed as coming from non-distortionary lump-sum
taxes.
9See, for example, Popp (2004) and Goolsbee (1998).
10For this paper, I assume that one-half of energy R&D occurs at the expense of other R&D and
one-half is new R&D spending. It is only the half that occurs at the expense of other R&D that has
a social cost of $4, so that crowdout = 0.5, as discussed in Popp (forthcoming, 2004). These papers
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show that assumptions about crowding out are important, and explain much of the variation found
across climate policy models that include induced technological change.
11The appendix is available from the author at http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/dcpopp/research.
html.
12Because the main interest of the model is to study the effect of policy-induced R&D, this elasticity
is calculated using differences in the carbon price with and without a carbon tax for a given year.
Please see the appendix, available at http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/dcpopp/research.html, for more
details.
13To compare these prices to existing estimates of renewable energy costs, it is useful to convert the
prices to cents per kWh. Using data on total primary energy supply (IEA 1997), I calculate the energy
services provided per ton of carbon emission. The initial carbon price of $276.29 in ENTICE-BR
yields a cost of energy of 1.8 /c/kWh (in 1990 U.S. dollars). In comparison, the backstop costs used
in Popp (forthcoming) imply costs of 2.4 /c/kWh , 7.1 /c/kWh, and 11.9 /c/kWh. Such estimates are
in the range of estimated renewable costs provided in the literature (see, for example, Table 7.25 in
Goldemberg, et al. (2000).)
14Because ENTICE-BR is a global model, permit trading cannot be modeled explicitly. However,
the optimal tax can also be thought of as the price of a permit that would result from an optimal
allocation of permits over time.
15Of course, the implied assumption that the social rate of return on R&D now equals that of
other investments implies that the government sets subsidy levels at a socially optimal level. Thus,
the results provide an upper bound for the potential of R&D subsidies. Realistically, one would
expect political constraints and imperfect information to limit the government’s ability to set optimal
subsidies. This strengthens the results that follow, which suggest that subsidies by themselves are not
nearly as effective as carbon taxes.
16All monetary figures are presented in 1990 U.S. dollars.
17Note that the emissions profiles resulting from such a policy are higher than typically advocated
by climate scientists, and do not achieve stabilization of carbon concentrations at twice those of pre-
industrial levels. ENTICE, and other models based on the original DICE model, use a cost-benefit
framework to compare the benefits of reduced emissions to the cost of achieving these reductions.
Because carbon emissions persist in the atmosphere, small changes in emissions today have little
effect on long-term temperature trends. At the same time, major reductions necessary to achieve
stabilization of atmospheric carbon concentrations are often seen as too costly (see, for example, the
discussion in chapter 7 of Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). The slow approach suggested by the DICE
model is also partially a result of assumptions about the potential damages from climate emissions
(see, for example, Kaufmann 1997). Nonetheless, because stricter carbon policies are often advocated
by policymakers, such policies are discussed in Section 3.4.
18To get this starting value, I begin with a total global R&D budget of $500 billion. In the U.S., two
percent of R&D spending in 1995 went to energy-related R&D. The $10 billion figure used in this
paper is simply two percent of the global level of R&D. The $1 billion figure for backstop research
represents an additional 10 percent of energy R&D, based on data in Anderson (1997).
19Such a policy is implemented in ENTICE-BR by first solving the model with a carbon tax and no
rate of return constraint. I then constrain R&D to the levels found in that run, and re-run the model
without a carbon tax.
20Note that, unlike Schneider and Goulder (1997), I only consider the effect of correcting the
knowledge market failures for energy R&D only, rather than broader policies designed to correct
market failures in all R&D markets.
21It is important to note that some of this $10 billion already comes from government spending.
Given this, the BAU R&D spending should be thought of as R&D spending assuming that current
trends continue, and the various policy simulations can be seen as deviations from these trends.
Because more R&D is publicly financed in the energy sector than in the economy as a whole, we
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would expect the deviation between private and social returns to be lower than in the general. This
suggests that the results here are an upper bound of the potential of R&D subsidies.
22The result that the carbon tax does not change is consistent of the theoretical predictions of
Goulder and Mathai’s (2000) benefit-cost model, which compares optimal tax levels with and without
policy-induced technological change (but ignores knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies).
23The result follows from the combination of the social returns on R&D being four times that of
other investments, and from the assumption that 50% of new energy R&D comes at the cost of other
R&D. Thus, the total social cost of new energy R&D is twice that of other investments.
24Note that, when making these adjustments to the model, small changes in other parameters
(typically the a parameter in equation (4)), are needed to keep initial R&D levels at reasonable
levels. The appendix, available at http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/dcpopp/research.html, includes the
complete set of parameters used, along with the level of R&D under the optimal policy with each set
of assumptions.
25In this case, even in the BAU scenario, 29% of energy comes from the backstop by 2055, and
64% by 2105. With an optimal carbon tax, these figures increase to 46% and 85%, respectively. See
Popp (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of a lower backstop price on other variables.
26Popp (forthcoming) shows that increased usage of the backstop with a low initial backstop price
lowers long-run atmospheric temperature by nearly a degree Celsius, even without any climate policy
in place.
27For example, Hoffert et al. (2002) discuss the need for advanced technology to stabilize carbon
emissions, writing that the greenhouse effect is “an energy problem that cannot simply be regulated
away” (p. 986).
28Note here that the social rate of return focuses on returns valued by the market, such as lower
energy costs or consumption. The additional benefits from improved environmental policy are not
included, since those benefits would not be part of the firm’s decision-making process on whether or
not to perform energy R&D.
29Note that the optimal policy remains to go slow, which is why an immediate spike in backstop
R&D does not occur in the optimal policy even with the assumption of higher returns to energy
R&D.
30Popp (forthcoming) includes a discussion of a policy restricting emissions without R&D
subsidies.
31Moreover, this result is generally robust to sensitivity analysis such as presented in Section 3.3.
Because these policies mandate specific levels of performance, changing parameter values does not
affect outcomes such as emissions or temperature, but rather changes the costs of achieving the policy
goal. As with the optimal tax policy, the role of R&D subsidies is enhanced when crowding out of
other R&D does not occur. Also, as in Popp (forthcoming), restricting emissions to 1995 levels is
welfare enhancing (although not as much as is the optimal tax policy) with a low backstop price,
as the carbon tax necessary to induce a switch to primarily carbon-free energy is not as large. For
example, in 2055, a tax of just $83.14 without subsidies and $72.33 with subsidies is sufficient to
limit emissions to 1995 levels, compared to a tax of $1758.93 with subsidies and the base parameters.
See Popp (forthcoming) for a more detailed analysis.
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